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Unknown quantum information cannot be perfectly copied (cloned). This statement is the bedrock
of quantum technologies and quantum cryptography, including the seminal scheme of Wiesner’s
quantum money,1 which was the first quantum-cryptographic proposal. Surprisingly, to our knowl-
edge, quantum money has not been tested experimentally yet. Here, we experimentally revisit the
Wiesner idea, assuming a banknote to be an image encoded in the polarization states of single
photons. We demonstrate that it is possible to use quantum states to prepare a banknote that
cannot be ideally copied without making the owner aware of only unauthorized actions. We provide
the security conditions for quantum money by investigating the physically-achievable limits on the
fidelity of 1-to-2 copying of arbitrary sequences of qubits. These results can be applied as a security
measure in quantum digital right management.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 05.30.-d, 42.50.Dv,
The seminal proposal of quantum money by Wiesner1
(see also Ref. [2]), followed by the introduction of quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) protocols by Bennet and
Brassard3 and by Ekert,4 have triggered a breathtaking
interest and progress not only in quantum cryptography
but, in general, in quantum information over the last
three decades. It is not surprising that Refs. [ 3,4] on
QKD are among the most often cited works in quantum
information and both quantum and classical cryptogra-
phy. Moreover, various commercial implementations of
QKD protocols (for a recent review see [ 5]), together
with quantum random-number generators and the D-
Wave machine (see, e.g., [6]) are probably the only com-
mercial applications of quantum information and quan-
tum optics up to now.7 Although, various protocols of
quantum money have already been proposed (see, e.g.
Refs. [8–16]), this interest cannot be compared with the
immense popularity and applicability of QKD (see Refs. [
17–19] as an example of recent and fundamental achieve-
ments). This is partially because there have not been, to
our knowledge, any experimental realizations of quantum
money performed yet. Here, we report not only an exper-
imental implementation of quantum money but also an
experimental attempt to its forgery using optimal cloning
machines.
Our experimental work basically describes one-by-one
attacks on each single qubit. In the quantum money
scheme, however, eavesdroppers, in principle, can access
every qubit at once. So, they can globally access mul-
tiple qubits and can seek superior attacks using such
global access. This could be a reason why there has
not been a known representative work for the experiment
of attacking quantum money, because this would need
to treat numerous qubits and difficult global controls of
their quantum states. The attacks presented in this work
are less distinguished from quantum cloning itself or the
attack for BB84 quantum key distribution. Thus, col-
lective or coherent attacks on multiple qubits simulta-
neously can, in principle, optimize the attacker’s strat-
egy. This is, nevertheless, considerably more demanding
if not impossible with the current state of experimen-
tal quantum information processing. In this paper, we
investigate a more accessible form of attack based on in-
dividual cloning which, in our view, represents a realistic
threat for near-future quantum communications, includ-
ing quantum money schemes.
Any information can be encoded as a sequence of zeros
and ones. This sequence can also be represented using
a set of single photons prepared in the horizontal and
vertical polarization states. The polarization states of a
photon can be described as a superposition of the two
orthogonal polarization states, i.e.,
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
| ↔ 〉+ eiφ sin θ
2
| l 〉, (1)
where the angles θ and φ are the spherical coordinates
of this qubit on the Bloch sphere, while ↔ and l denote
horizontal and vertical polarisations, respectively. For
each such state there exists an orthogonal state
|ψ⊥〉 = sin θ
2
| ↔ 〉 − eiφ cos θ
2
| l 〉. (2)
Any pair of such orthogonal states can be used to encode
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2logical values 0 and 1. Without knowing what particular
states have been used (i.e., without knowing θ and φ),
there is no way of telling (with certainty) what logical
value is associated with the photon.
Any attempt of gaining this information from the pho-
ton will disturb its polarization state and damage the
information. Therefore, using photons to transmit sen-
sitive information appears to be a promising idea. In
the simplest scenario, the sequence of polarized photons
is associated with a set of numbers indicating the cor-
rect measurement bases. These latter sequence needs to
be confidential. If this sequence would be intercepted
together with the sequence of photons, the quantum in-
formation could be read and reproduced at will. First,
by deterministically distinguishing between |ψ〉 and |ψ⊥〉
associated with the bit values 0 and 1, respectively. Next,
by reproducing the detected state.
Therefore, the advantages provided by this kind of
quantum communication are limited to protocols, where
a trusted arbiter checks the validity of a given sequence
of qubits. Thus, the sequence of qubits can be used, e.g.,
as one-time passwords (tokens)14 or arbitrated quantum
currency.1 However, some research has been conducted in
order to eliminate the need for an arbiter in the quantum
currency schemes.12,15
Currently, tokens are widely applied as an extra layer
of security, e.g., in a two-step authentication protocols
used in social media services or Internet banking etc.
While the classical tokens are sensitive to being copied,
the quantum tokens cannot be delivered to two or more
users at the same time without disturbing a given quan-
tum dataset.1,14–16
It is claimed today that the security of our data is as
good as its passwords. In the following text we discuss
how to generate and check the security of the best tokens
allowed by the laws of nature. The quantum passwords
cannot be copied nor viewed without damaging them.
However, quantum data are prone to noise and some level
of noise has to be tolerated in order to harness the ben-
efits of quantum technologies.
The quantum tokens can also be used as quantum
money. The idea of quantum money goes back to
Wiesner1 who proposed to embed a sequence of qubits
into banknotes that would be verified by banks. This
was the first idea of quantum cryptography introduced
already in the early 1970s and eventually published in
1983.1,20
In order to be able to verify the money, a bank would
attach information about the banknote serial number as
classical information. This pioneering idea evolved over
the last decades to more practical protocols, which are
shown to be more secure and less demanding on the
participating parties of a quantum currency system.12,15
However, all the protocols face the problem of decoher-
ence that makes the quantum banknotes to be usable
for a limited amount of time, even if the currency is
represented as a sequence of photons,14 which can have
exceptionally-long coherence times.
Photons are robust to decoherence, because they do
not usually interact with each other. Moreover, if the
string of photons is handled properly it can last in a co-
herent state long enough to be useful in some financial
transactions. Let us consider a transaction, where quan-
tum money is withdrawn at the speed of light from a bank
by an authorized user as a sequence of photons that ar-
rives at a payment terminal, which allows its user to redi-
rect the money to any other payment terminal. The final
user sends the sequence to the bank together with an ac-
count number, where the money is to be stored. Lossless
transmission of photons is impossible. Therefore, banks
would have to accept large enough parts of incomplete
quantum banknotes and issue new ones. The same is
done nowadays if a banknote is damaged or a small part
of it is missing. The communication between the pay-
ment terminals cannot be wiretapped without damaging
this quantum money. Thus, this quantum money scheme
(QMS) allows for some anonymity if the addresses of the
terminals are not assigned to a specific person and there
is at least one terminal used between the initial and final
users. However, the money could be signed without dam-
aging it using, e.g., the approach discussed in Ref. [21].
Perfect copying of quantum information is
impossible,15,22,23 but as it was shown in various
works, we can copy partially-known quantum informa-
tion with very high fidelity. If we are going to clone
some qubits more often than others, we can use a generic
distribution function g(θ, φ) to describe this intent. The
higher the value of g, the more frequent cloning of the
specific qubit is. This distribution function satisfies the
following normalization condition∫
Ω
g(θ, φ) dΩ = 1, (3)
where dΩ ≡ sin θ dφdθ and Ω is the full solid angle.
The distribution g can be arbitrary, but until now only
highly-symmetric distributions have been analysed (see,
e.g., [24–26] and references therein). Therefore, one can
be under the impression that this optimal cloning prob-
lem can be solved only for a highly-symmetric class of
distributions. However, as we show below, we are in
principle able to always find an optimal cloning machine
corresponding to any randomly generated quantum to-
kens or banknotes. Note that the most secure tokens are
the ones with the highest entropy. The same applies here,
because the lowest average cloning fidelity, corresponding
to the case most resistant to cloning attacks, is achieved
for a uniform distribution g, which has the highest possi-
ble entropy. However, while generating quantum money
of a finite size at random, it is hard to ensure each time
the perfect entropy. Therefore, in practice, we could deal
with any qubit distribution function g that could be po-
tentially known to the counterfeiter. In particular, there
exist qubit distributions g made of a weighted sum of
two Dirac’s delta functions at any antipodes of the Bloch
sphere. In this special case, the problem is reduced to
the classical case of standard digital tokens. This is be-
3Classical banknote
Quantum banknote 1 Quantum banknote 2
a
b c
↔↕↺↻↕↕
↔↕↺↕↕
Encoding 1
Encoding 2
FIG. 1: An illustrative example of (a) a classical banknote. In panels (b) and (c) the simplified banknote from panel (a)
with the decreased number of colors and resolution is encoded experimentally in two ways to form two examples of quantum
banknotes. The symbols used here correspond to different linear (↔ , l , ...) and circular (	 and  ) photon polarisations (as
explained in the main text). Note that the white regions in (b) and (c) correspond to the lack of photons.
cause these particular functions tell us that there are only
two states sent that could be discriminated deterministi-
cally. Quantum money of this kind should obviously be
avoided.
Let us briefly review the main possible attack sce-
narios. Without any knowledge about the token, the
counterfeiter can use the universal quantum cloner.27 If
the states, appearing in the qubit sequence, are known
but their order is unknown, the attacker can apply a
specialized optimal quantum cloning machine. This is
equivalent to the situation in which the attacker has
some information about the money statistics, but does
not know the sequence of qubits itself. The results of
such an attack can be seen in Fig. 1. Unfortunately, if
the attacker knows the sequence of bases, the quantum
money (tokens) can be perfectly copied.
Noise tolerance versus security. Let us estimate
the level of noise tolerance needed for a quantum to-
ken to be validated in realistic conditions and compare
it to the level of noise introduced by a given optimal
quantum cloning. By doing so, we will limit the class
of distributions associated with acceptable tokens. We
assume that a counterfeiter can replace the noisy com-
munication channel with a less noisy one and perform
a quantum man-in-the-middle attack with an optimal
quantum cloning machine. An equivalent assumption is
that the counterfeiter is a party in the QMS. Finding the
optimal cloning transformation for a given g is a semi-
definite programming problem.28,29 Such problem can be
described as a task of finding a semi-definite operator χˆ
(a cloning map) describing the copying process that max-
imizes the average single-copy fidelity F . Such operator
is isomorphic to a completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map.30 The average single-copy fidelity for an
arbitrary distribution (for symmetric 1→ 2 cloning) can
be expressed25,26 as
F =
1
2
∫
Ω
g(θ, φ) (F0 + F1) dΩ, (4)
where the fidelities of copying a particular qubit for the
first and second clones are
F0 = Tr
[
(ρˆT ⊗ ρˆ⊗ 1ˆ )χˆ] andF1 = Tr [(ρˆT ⊗ 1ˆ ⊗ ρˆ)χˆ] ,
(5)
where ρˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, T stands for transposition, and 1ˆ
is the single-qubit identity operator. The density ma-
trices of both clones are identical and they read ρi =
Trin,i⊕1
[
(ρˆT ⊗ 1⊗2)χˆ], where we calculate the partial
trace over the input qubit and one of the two clones (⊕
stands for sum modulo 2).
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FIG. 2: Contour plot showing how the probability of detect-
ing a qubit of an unknown state |ψ(θ, φ)〉 for money verifi-
cation depends on the imperfect choice of the measurement
direction ∆θ and the photon verification (or discrimination)
resolution κ. Specifically, this probability is equivalent to the
fidelity Fproc(∆θ, κ) for which the Bloch vector is rotated with
respect to its correct orientation by ∆θ for a given value of κ.
Note that the probability does not depend on θ or φ, but only
on ∆θ, which measures the angle between the original and ro-
tated Bloch vectors. The solid black lines mark two specific
values of κ: κ0 = 2.9515 describes the minimal resolution
needed to detect an attack with an optimal universal cloning
machine and κd = 25 corresponds to the resolution reached in
our experiment. Note that the shape of the depicted relation
depends on the dispersion function of the detector. Here, this
function is chosen as the von Mises–Fisher distribution.
The average single-copy fidelity written in a compact
form reads
F = Tr
(
Rˆχˆ
)
. (6)
In order to find the optimal cloning map χˆ, one needs to
compute the Rˆ operator defined as
Rˆ =
1
2
∫
Ω
g(θ, φ)ρˆT ⊗ (1ˆ ⊗ ρˆ+ ρˆ⊗ 1ˆ )dΩ. (7)
Remarkably, we show in the Methods that this operator
depends only on its five expansion coefficients of g in the
basis of spherical harmonics, regardless of the exact form
of g. The optimal map χˆ is found by maximizing F in
Eq. (6) for a given Rˆ with the optimization algorithm
described in [28] (see also Refs. [17,24–26,31]).
The output distribution gout of the cloned qubits will
differ from g, because perfect cloning is impossible. Each
cloning machine prepares a perfect clone (1), with proba-
bility equal to the fidelity Fi, and an orthogonal state (2),
with probability 1−Fi. Thus, the distribution gout(θ, φ)
of the cloned qubit states can be expressed as
gout(θ, φ) = Fi(θ, φ)g(θ, φ) (8)
+ [1− Fi(θ + pi, φ+ pi)] g(θ + pi, φ+ pi).
There is no difference between g and gout, if the function
is symmetric with respect to inverting the directions of
the Bloch sphere. This includes the scenarios both for the
best case (a uniform qubit distribution) and the worst
case (a sequence of distinguishable states). The class
of such distributions defines the so-called mirror phase-
covariant cloner (or cloning) (MPCC).25 Note that the
MPCC is a generalization of the phase-covariant cloners
(PCCs), which enable optimal copying of a qubit state
from the equator of the Bloch sphere32 or other states on
the Bloch sphere with a definite angle θ24,33 (see the Sup-
plementary Material34 for more details about the MPCC
and PCC). The output distribution cannot be used di-
rectly to quantify the quality of the clones, because it
does not carry the information about the order of states
in a given sequence.
The analysed sequence would usually contain some ad-
ditional noise due to small random polarization rotations
caused by various imperfections. These include state
preparation, distribution, storage, and finally delivery
and analysis. In practice, all these imperfections lead
to the average sequence fidelity Fpass < 1 with respect
to the ideally-performed qubit preparation, storage, and
detection steps.
For simplicity, we assume that all the enlisted protocol
elements are perfect, except the final step of our state
analysis. If this final step is the polarization analysis of
single photons with standard detectors and a polarization
beam splitter, we have Fpass ≈ 98%. Here, we model
the joint dispersion of the transmission channel and the
state verification with respect to the target polarization
by the spherical dispersion model on a sphere given by
the von Mises–Fisher distribution35 (i.e., the Gaussian
distribution on a sphere)
f(κ, α) =
exp(κ cosα)
2piI0(κ)
, (9)
which is the probability density function of any qubit
prepared in a target state given by its Bloch vector being
rotated by an angle α. The level of concentration of the
density function around the state vector |ψ〉 is given by
the parameter κ. The density function is normalized with
the modified Bessel function I0(κ).36 From this model it
follows that the probability of detecting a qubit described
by the density matrix ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| is equivalent to the
average fidelity (6) and is given by
Fproc(ρ, κ) =
∫ pi
0
∫ 2pi
0
f(κ, α)〈µ|ρ|µ〉dδ dα , (10)
where |µ〉 = cos( θ−α2 )|ψ〉 + exp(iδ) sin( θ−α2 )|ψ⊥〉. For
example, our direct calculations for α = 0 lead to
Fproc(θ, κ) = [2κ cos θ coshκ + piκI1(κ) sin θ + 2(κ −
cos θ) sinhκ)]/(4κ sinhκ), where I1 is the modified Bessel
function.36 Thus, for the QMS to be feasible, we
need to accept those sequences with fidelity Fpass =
Fproc(|ψ〉〈ψ|, κ0). Hence, κ0 describes the minimum res-
olution required to reveal an attack using a cloner with a
5given value of Fpass. The value of κ0 can be derived
numerically from the fixed value of Fpass correspond-
ing to the fidelity of polarization analysis. For a sin-
gle qubit, we can use the following security condition
Fproc(ρi, κ) < Fpass, where now κ describes the disper-
sion of the channel used by the counterfeiter to deliver
the copied sequence. If this condition is satisfied, the
counterfeiter cannot cheat the verification process. The
verification process is performed on the full sequence of
qubits. Therefore, any verification process that allows
for some implementation imperfections should depend on
the average verification fidelity. For a long sequence of
cloned qubits this average fidelity is
F¯i(κ) =
∫
Ω
g(θ, φ)Fproc(ρi, κ)dΩ , (11)
whereas for the verification threshold reads as
F¯pass(κ0) =
∫
Ω
g(θ, φ)Fpass(θ, φ)dΩ. (12)
These values can be obtained by projecting the delivered
quantum banknote on the associated sequence of bases.
These can be approximated as the ratios of the number of
the correctly projected states to the number of the con-
clusive state projections. A quantum banknote passes
the verification process if F¯i > F¯pass. These quantities
(used in this inequality) depend implicitly on the choice
of g as the quality of the optimally-counterfeited state de-
pends on g, specifically on its five expansion coefficients
in terms of spherical harmonics, i.e., five real numbers
that could be estimated by the counterfeiter after mea-
suring some random parts of the banknote. Thus, in the
following text, we assume that g is publicly known. We
demonstrate experimentally that this weakness could be
exploited by a counterfeiter.
Let us consider the situation where the security thresh-
old is given by a theoretical value of F¯i, where κ → ∞,
which does not take into account the threat of the coun-
terfeiter using the knowledge about g. In this case, one
would naively assume that the forgery cannot lead to the
fidelity F¯i exceeding 5/6, corresponding to the fidelity
of the universal cloning machine.27 It would appear that
using the security threshold of F¯pass = 5/6 might be a
good idea, as it makes the QMS more robust against
errors. This means that one could naively allow the res-
olution of the verification process κ0 to be as small as
κ0 = 2.9515. This value is obtained from Fproc(0, κ0) =
[κ0 coshκ0 + (κ0 − 1) sinhκ0]/(2κ0 sinhκ0) = 5/6. To
illustrate that this could be a problem, let us imagine
that we verify qubits described by the Bloch vectors ro-
tated by an angle ∆θ from the Bloch vectors of the ex-
pected states. In Fig. 2, we see that the measured fi-
delity Fproc(∆θ, κ0) would be seemingly above the se-
curity threshold even for ∆θ ≈ pi/2, which means that
the verification process would recognize a large volume
of pure states as valid. However, it would not accept the
states for which the Bloch vectors are rotated by more
that 90◦ from the target Bloch vectors. In this regime, we
FIG. 3: Experimental setup for cloning quantum bankotes.
Components are labelled as follows: HWP is half-wave plate,
QWP is quarter wave-plate, PDBS is polarisation dependent-
beam splitter, PBS is polarising beam splitter, BD is beam
divider, NDF is neutral density filter, and D is single pho-
ton detector. A successful cloning and verification of a qubit
from a given sequence is registered as a simultaneous detec-
tion event at the two detectors.
are approaching the situation where any state prepared
in a basis, which is unbiased with respect to the veri-
fication basis, would pass the verification process. The
counterfeiter can guess the conjugate basis correctly with
probability 2/3 and choose the correct state in the match-
ing basis with probability 1/6. This means that 83% of
an arbitrary banknote prepared by the counterfeiter is ac-
cepted and the QMS is broken. Fortunately, this is not
exactly the case as Fproc(pi/2, 2.9515) = 0.8115 < 5/6.
Note that this could be dangerous if the dispersion of the
state verification would not be described with the von
Mises–Fisher distribution, but with some similar func-
tion. Thus, for the low resolution regime of κ0 ≈ 2.9515
the full characterization of the verification setup is re-
quired in order to exclude this classical attack.
The detection resolution κd of a given experimental
setup should be as large as possible. In our experiment we
achieved κd = 25, which is obtained from Fproc(0, κd) =
[κ0 coshκd + (κd − 1) sinhκd]/(2κd sinhκd) = 0.98.
Even if the detection resolution is perfect κ0 → ∞, the
quantum money can be counterfeited using a specialized
quantum cloner optimized for g. In the following section
we illustrate this with an experiment.
Experimental quantum forgery. Let us consider
cloning the quantum banknote 1 from Fig. 1, where
single-photon polarization states appear approximately
with the following probabilities: p( l ) = 0.125, p( l) =
0.125, p(l) = 0.125, p(↔) = 0.125, p(	) = 0.25, p(
) = 0.25, where the poles of the Bloch sphere corre-
spond to the left-circular (	) and right-circular () po-
larization states, while the equatorial plane is spanned
by the horizontal (↔), vertical (l), diagonal ( l ), and
anti-diagonal ( l) polarization states. In this case the
optimal cloning machine is an axially-symmetric phase-
covariant cloner26 corresponding to the MPCC.25 The
probability distribution is described here with only one
6Quantum copy  (UC) Quantum copy (MPCC)
Hybrid copy  (UC) Hybrid copy (PCC)
a
Quantum banknote 1
b
Quantum banknote 2
☒ ☒
☒ ☑
FIG. 4: Experimental quantum banknotes 1 (a) and 2 (b) are copied probabilistically with an optimal 1-to-2 linear optical
cloning machine shown in Fig. 3 and subsequently verified. This device can be tuned to implement, in special cases, the
universal quantum cloner (UC), the phase-covariant cloner (PCC), and the mirror phase-covariant cloner (MPCC). Note that
the white regions in quantum banknotes, or their copies, correspond to either a lack of photons or the cases where the cloning
process failed to deliver one photon per banknote. One observes that the copies, which are provided with the best possible
cloning machines, are noisy and, thus, the sequences of qubits are damaged (shown in red). The performance of a given cloning
process depends on the statistics of photon polarisations. Thus, the copies of quantum banknote 1 (a) obtained by an optimal
purely-quantum cloner (the UC and MPCC) fail the verification. The copies of banknote 2 (b) obtained by an optimal hybrid
(i.e., quantum-classical) cloner fail the verification if the UC is used, but pass the verification if the PCC is applied.
FIG. 5: Success probabilities of the cloning processes for
quantum banknotes 1 and 2 (QB1 and QB2), and optimal
universal cloning (UC). The red frames show the error bars
of the measured probabilities. The grey surface shows the
minimum cloning efficiency needed to output on average more
cloned photons than the input photons.
FIG. 6: Experimentally measured average cloning fidelity F¯i
for quantum banknotes 1 and 2 (QB1 and QB2), and optimal
universal cloning (UC). The red frames show the error bars of
the measured probabilities. The verification threshold (gray
surface) is set at 0.833, which is the fidelity of the optimal
universal cloning process, i.e., the process that ignores any
information about g.
7nonzero number, i.e., c2,0 = 0.25
√
5pi (using the nota-
tion from Ref. [26]: a2 = c2,0/
√
5pi and |Γ| = 0). The
fidelity of copying the equatorial states is then equal
to F (↔) = F (l) = F ( l ) = F ( l) = 0.789 and
F (	) = F () = 0.894 for the pole states. This results
in the theoretical value of F¯i(κ → ∞) = 0.842, which
is a bit above the security threshold of F¯i = 0.833. Us-
ing our experimental setup shown in Fig. 3, we achieve
F¯i,experiment = (81.9± 2.0)%. This experimental value is
close to the universal cloning limit, i.e., F¯i = 0.833. In
this case, only (14.0±2.9)% of the sequence was success-
fully copied. Alternatively, when we attack this banknote
with our implementation of the optimal universal cloner,
we obtain F¯i,experiment = (81.5±1.2)%; and (19.6±1.2)%
of qubits are copied. This makes the forgery unsuccess-
ful for two reasons: (i) the quality of the delivered qubits
is lower than allowed, (ii) we delivered less than 50%
of the sequence to each recipient. More than 50% of
the qubits have to be delivered to exclude the possibil-
ity of duplicating the money by cutting it into pieces.
However, the forgery becomes successful if one uses the
optimal quantum cloning process, with high fidelity but
low success rate, interchangeably with a classical cloning
process, with high success rate but low fidelity.
Let us consider another case, where we can crack the
QMS and the quantum banknote 2 from Fig. 1 is de-
scribed with the following probabilities: p( l ) = 0.125,
p( l) = 0.125, p(l) = 0.125, p(↔) = 0.125, p(	) = 0.50,
and p() = 0. In this case the optimal cloning machine
is also an axially-symmetric (phase-covariant) cloner26
(ASC), where c1,0 = 0.5
√
3pi, c2,0 = 0.25
√
5pi, which
corresponds to a1 = 0.5, a2 = 0.25, and |Γ| = ∞,
using the notation from Ref. [ 26]. We have falsified
this banknote by applying interchangeably both the op-
timal classical and the best quantum copying strategies
(see Ref. [ 31]). The optimal classical copying can be
viewed as measuring a fraction  of the original photons
from the sequence in a random basis (selected according
to g) and preparing two photons in the detected state.
We implemented this strategy by randomly swapping a
fraction of photons from the original sequence with the
circularly-polarized photons selected in accord with g (for
details see the Methods). The fidelity of this strategy
is (3 + 〈cos θ〉2)/4 = (3 + a21)/4. We used this opti-
mal classical strategy with probability  = 0.4. Using
this method, we implemented a cloning attack, which
copies circa (54.9 ± 0.1)% of the sequence (this means
that we could sacrifice about 4% of the sequence to es-
timate g). Our implementation of the optimal quan-
tum copying strategy allows us to copy 24.8 ± 0.1% of
the sequence with a fidelity of (92.4 ± 0.4)% (the the-
oretical value is 92.6%). The optimal classical copying
strategy31 operated with fidelity circa 81.3%. This pro-
vides us with the experimental average cloning fidelity
of F¯i,experiment = 0.842 ± 0.002. Thus, we demonstrated
that it is possible to crack the Wiesner QMS with cur-
rently available technology. However, this was possible
only because the incoming sequence of photons was syn-
chronized with the probing photons allowing them to in-
teract on a beam splitter. The counterfeiter would face
some additional technical challenges when applying the
discussed copying method in real life (see the discussion
in Ref. [17]). This cloning regime, where the cloning pro-
cess happens with a fidelity larger than the fidelity of
the best classical copying process, and the transmitted
qubits are successfully copied with a probability larger
than 50%, can also be applied constructively to increase
the classical product capacity of a quantum channel.31
The experimental results of the above-discussed
copying strategies for the two experimental quantum
banknotes are summarized in Fig. 4. Moreover, in
Figs. 5-6 we demonstrate how the measured success
probability of the cloning process and the corresponding
single-copy fidelity depend on the value of the hybridiza-
tion parameter . The selected values of this parameter
correspond to optimal classical ( = 1), hybrid ( = 0.4),
and optimal quantum cloning ( = 0). The significant
reduction of variance in these figures with respect to
purely quantum cloning ( = 0) is caused by using a
robust classical copying process interchangeably with
a more delicate optimal quantum cloning strategy (for
details see the Methods).
Conclusion. We demonstrated that using currently
available technology we are able to both implement and
crack the original QMS of Wiesner,1 given that (i) a
sequence of qubits, representing the quantum banknote
is not sampled uniformly over the Bloch sphere, (ii) the
banknote is considered valid if more than 50% of the
sequence is delivered and its average fidelity is above
the fidelity of the universal cloner,27 i.e., 83.3%. From
our results it follows that to make the Wiesner QMS
secure against copying, one should apply a g-dependent
verification threshold, which corresponds to the average
single-copy fidelity of the relevant optimal quantum
cloner. We have shown that a specialized optimal
cloner for an arbitrary qubit distribution g can easily be
found by computing only its five parameters and subse-
quently applying the optimization procedure described
in Ref. [28]. We believe that our results will stimulate
further research on secure quantum communication and
quantum technologies.
Methods.
Theory. In our theoretical considerations we apply
the spherical harmonics36 Y ml for l = 0, 1, 2 and m =
0, 1, ..., l. The spherical harmonics for m < 0 are simply
related to these for m > 0, because
Y ml = (−1)m Y¯ −ml . (13)
The operator Rˆ, in terms of the spherical harmonics Yl,m,
8can be expressed as
Rˆ =
2∑
l=0
l∑
m=−l
Kˆl,mcl,m , (14)
where
Kˆl,m =
1
2
∫
Ω
ρˆT ⊗ (1ˆ ⊗ ρˆ+ ρˆ⊗ 1ˆ ) Y¯ ml (θ, φ) dΩ , (15)
the bar denotes complex conjugation, and
cl,m =
∫
Ω
g(θ, φ)Y ml (θ, φ) dΩ. (16)
It can be directly shown that
ρˆT ⊗ (1ˆ ⊗ ρˆ+ ρˆ⊗ 1ˆ ) = 2 2∑
l=0
l∑
m=−l
Kˆl,mY
m
l (θ, φ) , (17)
hence, we do not need terms with l > 2. For a real-valued
distribution g we obtain
cl,m = (−1)m c¯l,−m. (18)
This property follows from the definition of the spheri-
cal harmonics. Thus, for the normalized g distributions
one computes cl,m only for l = 1, 2 and m = 0, 1, ..., l,
which results in five integrals in total. Depending on
the symmetry of the distribution g, some of the integrals
vanish, which simplifies further calculations. The expan-
sion coefficients Kˆl,m can be written in the form of block
matrices as given in the Supplementary Material.34
Experiment. The experimental setup is depicted in
Fig. 3. Pairs of photons were generated in the process of
spontaneous parametric down-conversion using a LiIO3
crystal pumped by 200mW of cw Kr+ laser beam at
413 nm. Hundreds of photon pairs were collected using
single-mode fibres and transferred to the input of the
cloner setup. One photon of each pair (i.e., a cloned
photon) was used to encode a bit of quantum informa-
tion into its polarization state, while the other photon
served as an ancilla being either horizontally or verti-
cally polarized. In the next step, the cloned and ancil-
lary photon interfere on a polarization-dependent beam
splitter (PDBS). Ideally, this beam splitter should trans-
mit the horizontally-polarized light with intensity trans-
missivity of 0.789 and the vertically-polarized light with
intensity transmissivity of 0.211. Due to manufacturing
errors, the real intensity transmissivities of our PDBS
are 0.76 and 0.18 for horizontal and vertical polarisa-
tions, respectively. To correct for this deviation between
the real and ideal PDBS parameters, a beam divider as-
sembly (BDA) is inserted into each output mode of the
PDBS. This BDA consists of two beam displacers sepa-
rating and subsequently rejoining horizontal and vertical
polarization components of photons wave packets. By
inserting a neutral-density filter (NDF) into either a hor-
izontal or vertical polarization mode inside the BDA, one
can achieve polarization sensitive losses and, thus, com-
pensate for incorrect parameters of the PDBS. Note that
this compensation can restore an ideal operation of the
PDBS at the expense of a lower success rate. To bal-
ance the rate of the cloned and ancillary photons, some
additional NDFs can be placed behind the BDAs. Fi-
nally, both the cloned and ancillary photons are sub-
jected to our polarization analysis consisting of a set of
quarter-wave (QWP) and half-wave (HWP) plates fol-
lowed by a polarizing prism.37 The coincident photon
detections are counted for each combination of the polar-
ization projection onto the horizontal, vertical, diagonal,
anti-diagonal, and both circular polarisations. The den-
sity matrices of the corresponding two-photon states are
then estimated using a maximum-likelihood algorithm.38
A more detailed account on the experimental procedure
is available in our technical paper.39 The swapping proce-
dure used for the optimal classical copying strategy was
implemented with the setup shown in Fig. 3 by remov-
ing the PDBS and filters used in the BDAs. We ap-
plied the following hybrid quantum-classical cloning pro-
cedure: Initially, we prepared the best classical replace-
ment for ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, i.e., σˆ = ∫
Ω
g|ψ〉〈ψ| dΩ in the ancil-
lary mode and randomly swapped it with the input state
ρˆ for a fraction  of the input photons. For the remaining
1− photons we performed the relevant optimal quantum
cloning. When properly tuned, this procedure is far less
noisy than the implementation of pure quantum cloning
and, thus, the quality (described by, e.g., the dispersion
of the fidelity) of this hybrid cloning procedure depends
mostly on the quality of the quantum cloning process (see
Figs. 5-6).
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Supplementary Material
Abstract: In this supplementary material we pro-
vide more details on our theoretical approach. We recall
definitions and some properties of a few known optimal
axially-symmetric quantum cloners, which we have im-
plemented experimentally in this work. These include the
universal cloner (UC), the phase-covariant cloner (PCC),
and the mirror-phase-covariant cloner (MPCC). We also
present the expansion coefficients Kˆl,m. Moreover, we
present an additional figure of the measured fidelities.
Axially-symmetric quantum cloning
The figure of merit for the quantum cloning machines
is the fidelity of their clones. The special case, where
the qubits are uniformly distributed around the poles of
the Bloch sphere corresponds to the axially-symmetric
cloning described in Ref. [ 26]. This class of cloning
machines includes both phase-covariant cloners (PCC)
and mirror-phase-covariant cloners (MPCC) as special
cases. The former is a cloning process optimized for a
given qubit distribution, where there is a higher chance
of cloning a qubit corresponding to one of the poles than
the other pole (see Fig. 7). The latter optimal cloning
process is optimized for mirror-symmetric distribution on
a Bloch sphere (see Fig. 7). Note that the optimal uni-
versal cloner (UC) is a special case of MPCC.
An arbitrary optimal 1→ 2 cloning of qubits given by
an axially-symmetric distribution can be expressed as a
unitary transformation26
|	〉a|	〉c → Λ+|		〉a,b|〉c + Λ¯+|ψ〉a,b|	〉c, (19)
|〉a|	〉c → Λ−|〉a,b|	〉c + Λ¯−|ψ〉a,b|〉c, (20)
where Λ¯± =
√
1− Λ2±, |ψ〉 = (|	〉 + |	〉)/
√
2, and
a, b, c stand for the two copy modes and the ancillary
mode, respectively. For the PCC, Λ± ∈ {0, 1} and Λ+ =
1− Λ−. For example, if p(	) p(), then Λ+ = 1 and
Λ− = 0. In particular, the cloning transformation for the
mirror-phase-covariant cloner25 can be expressed as
|	〉a|	〉c → Λ|		〉a,b|〉c + Λ¯|ψ〉a,b|	〉c, (21)
|〉a|	〉c → Λ|〉a,b|	〉c + Λ¯|ψ〉a,b|〉c. (22)
Quantum banknote 1 is cloned in the optimal way if Λ =
0.88. The optimal universal cloning (UC) is a special case
of the MPCC and it corresponds to Λ =
√
2/3.
In the case of an axially-symmetric distribution, where
all equatorial states appear with the same probability,
there is a single parameter26
Γ =
√
2γ−(γ+ − 1)
γ2+ − γ2−
, (23)
that can be used to select the optimal cloning transfor-
mation, which in the case of quantum banknotes 1 and 2
ba
FIG. 7: Assorted axially-symmetric qubit distributions over
the Bloch sphere, where the shade corresponds to the proba-
bility of choosing a qubit at the specific point on the sphere.
The first example (a) is an axially-symmetric qubit distribu-
tion, which is optimally cloned by PCC. The next example
(b), corresponds to an axially-symmetric qubit distribution
with additional mirror symmetry. This distribution is opti-
mally cloned by MPCC.
FIG. 8: Single-copy fidelities F¯i for the states with different
linear and circular polarizations measured during the encod-
ing of our two quantum banknotes 1 and 2 (QB1 for  = 0 and
QB2 for  = 0.4), and the optimal universal cloner (UC for
 = 0). The grey surface shows the theoretical fidelity of the
universal cloner. The red frames show the error bars of the
measured fidelities. This figure can be compared with Figs.
5 and 6 in the main article.
depends only on the probabilities p(	) and p(), because
γ± = p(	) ± p(). If |Γ| > 1, the optimal cloner is the
PCC. Alternatively, if |Γ| = 0, the optimal cloner is the
MPCC. Here, we analyse the case where p(	) = p() or
p() = 0.
Hybrid quantum-classical cloning
Our linear-optical implementation of the quantum
cloning machine works probabilistically. Thus, to im-
prove the cloning efficiency, we apply, interchangeably,
the optimal quantum and deterministic classical copy-
ing processes. Specifically, we classically (or quantumly)
copied a fraction  (or 1− ) of the input photons. Thus,
 can be treated as a hybridization parameter. The mea-
sured fidelities are presented in Fig 8.
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UC, ε = 0 MPCC, ε = 0
UC, ε = 0.4 MPCC, ε = 0.4
a
Quantum banknote 1
b
Quantum banknote 1
☒ ☒
☒ ☒
UC, ε = 1 MPCC, ε = 1
c
Quantum banknote 1
☒ ☒
FIG. 9: Experimental quantum banknote 1 is copied probabilistically, and subsequently verified, with the optimal 1-to-2 linear
optical cloning machine shown in Fig. 3 . One observes that the copies, which are provided with the best possible cloning
machines, are noisy and, thus, the sequences of qubits are damaged (shown in red). The performance of the cloning process
depends on the statistics of photon polarisations and on the hybridisation parameter , as shown in panels (a), (b), and (c).
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UC, ε = 0 PCC, ε = 0
UC, ε = 0.4 PCC, ε = 0.4
a
Quantum banknote 2
b
Quantum banknote 2
☒ ☒
☒
UC, ε = 1 PCC, ε = 1
c
Quantum banknote 2
☒ ☒
☑
FIG. 10: Same as in Fig. 9 but for quantum banknote 2.
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Expansion coefficients Kˆl,m
The expansion coefficients Kˆl,m, given in Eq. (15), of
the operator Rˆ, given in Eq. (14), can be written in the
form of block matrices as follows:
Kˆ0,0 =
√
pi
12
(
3Aˆ+ Bˆ 2CˆT
2Cˆ 3Aˆ− Bˆ
)
, (24)
Kˆ1,0 =
1
2
√
pi
12
(
Aˆ+ Bˆ 0ˆ
0ˆ −Aˆ+ Bˆ
)
, (25)
Kˆ1,1 = −
√
pi
24
(
Cˆ Aˆ
0ˆ Cˆ
)
, (26)
Kˆ2,0 = −1
6
√
pi
5
(
−Bˆ CˆT
Cˆ Bˆ
)
, (27)
Kˆ2,1 = −1
2
√
pi
30
(
Cˆ Bˆ
0ˆ −Cˆ
)
, (28)
Kˆ2,2 =
√
pi
30
(
0ˆ Cˆ
0ˆ 0ˆ
)
, (29)
where Aˆ = diag[2, 2, 2, 2], Bˆ = diag[2, 0, 0,−2], Cij =
(δi,2 + δi,3)δj,1 + (δj,2 + δj,3)δi,4, and 0ˆ is a 4× 4 matrix
of zeros. Moreover, it follows from Eq. (13) that Kˆl,m =
(−1)m KˆTl,−m.
